The issue of conditionality and how the EU should seek to influence positive transformations in its periphery is as relevant today as it was in the early 1990s. There are some important lessons that can still be learned from the Spanish transition to democracy in this respect. By combining strict conditionality with its 'normative power', the European Community managed to shape -if not make (Fishman 2003) -the Spanish transition to democracy. The consensus surrounding European integration worked as a unifying factor amongst all of the elite groups by giving them a common goal. This broad consensus ensured that no elite group could act in the sort of irresponsible way that could jeopardise the democratisation process and, by inference, the integration of Spain with the Community. At the same time, the EC worked as a sort of moderating force. Neither of these positive effects would have occurred had the EC not used its leverage potential and remained firmed in its stance of conditioning accession to Spain taking clear steps toward democratisation.
Eurocommunist groups and the Socialist International were particularly active in supporting the opposition to the Franco regime (ibid p. 178). Even in Britain, despite 'limited recognition', condemnation to the regime -amplified by the question of Gibraltar -was widespread (Portero 1999, pp. 224-226) . The United States, on the other hand, remained oddly detached from the situation and seemed not to offer either support for the regime nor the opposition forces.
Considering the active role taken by the European Community -declaring in a communiqué that the new Southern European applications had 'entrusted the EC a political responsibility that it could not avoid without denying its very foundational pacts' -and the importance the process of European integration had for Spain's consolidation of democracy, it is easy to understand why the view that European integration was the 'principal catalyst for democratisation in Spain' (Closa and Haywood 2004, pp. 16-17) became popular.
It now appears, though, that the Spanish 'model' of democratic transition through consensus (Alonso and Muro 2011; Colomer 1995; Edles 1998, pp. 6; Gunther 1992; Haywood 2005, p. 39; Linz and Stepan 1996) may have contributed to the new democratic institutions suffering from the legacy of authoritarianism. Much has been written recently about how Spain's current troubles directly relate to the way the transition to democracy was achieved. The view that Spain is something of a 'frozen democracy' -where regeneration of elites and institutional reform is particularly hard to achieve -challenges the common assumption that the Spanish transition was nothing else than a resounding success (Field 2011, p.2; Hagopian 1990; Magone 2009, p. 430) . As put by McDonough et al., the 'viability of Spanish democracy' may have been achieved 'at some cost to its quality ' (1998, p. 1) . On top of this, as events within the EU (e.g. the democratic crises in Greece and Hungary) and its immediate vicinity (with the initial furore surrounding the Arab Spring being replaced by pessimism) rapidly unfold, the EU's potential as a democratising agent once again jumps to the fore. It is with such developments in mind that a revision of the role Europe played in the democratisation of Spain can be particularly enlightening. Many parallels can be drawn between the influence the EC had as a 'facilitator of democratic establishment' (Closa and Heywood 2004 p. 17) in Spain and the role it can play in the democratisation of its periphery. This paper will analyse how the process of European integration supported the consolidation of democracy in Spain at a noninstitutional level by looking at its influence on the elite's behaviour and calculations. Indeed, it was this sort of non-institutional influence, which is not solely related to the acquis communautarie and a narrow understanding of Europeanisation, which greatly explains how the EC and its member states shaped Spain's democratisation process. There are, perhaps, still lessons to be learned from the Spanish experience. In order to understand how a democratic 'pull' -characterised by a non-institutionalised or extra-institutional dimension -influenced 3 the Spanish transition at elite level this paper will present a short account of the EU's 'evolution' as a democratising agent, followed by a short description of how international considerations can shape democratic outcomes by influencing elite behaviour. It will finally analyse how Europe's influence shaped the preferences of the political elites during the Spanish democratisation process.
Europe as a democratic influence
Although a key aspect today, Spain's path to democracy was not directly influenced by the formal and explicit democratic demands evident in the chronology of European Treaties.
Europe's positive influence (for the most part) on Spanish democratisation was far more informal. The pressures of Europeanisation -understood as the institutional demands towards convergence and adaptation -were less comprehensive in the 1980s, and even less so in the 1970s. Indeed, before the SEA came into effect the Community the Treaty of Rome founded in 1957 was arguably 'still little more than a customs union, supplemented by an expensive and wasteful agricultural policy' (Stirk 1996 p. 208) , and terms like 'Eurosclerosis' and 'Europessimism' were commonly used to describe Europe's 'dismal state' during the 1970s (Griffiths 2006 p. 187) . On the political front the Community seemed unable to 'develop a defence profile, or even to consolidate a common foreign policy' (Stirk 1996, p. 208) .
Similarly, the Council of Europe had no supranational power (Messenger 2006, p. 40) and had the 'minimalist mandate' -mainly due to British reservations (ibid; Dinan 2006, pp. 300-301) - to 'promote European unity by debate, publicity and research' (Davies 1996 (Davies p. 1083 . The pessimism was such that The Economist even decided to close its Brussels office in 1982 and the cover of its 20th March issue of the same year mischievously announced the death of the EC (Ludlow 2006, p. 222) . Greater political integration was not actively pursued until the late 1980s and early 1990s when, under the leadership of Jacques Delors, the Maastricht Treaty and the wider process of Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) were set in motion. It was this Europe, the Europe of 'Eurosclerosis' and 'Europessimism' that Spain applied to join in July 1977.
Bearing in mind this 'dismal' state of affairs in which the EC found itself in the 1970s -a situation not entirely dissimilar to the recent 'confidence crisis' in the EU (The Telegraph 2012) -any analysis of the influence Europe may have had in the democratisation of Spain needs to focus more on non-institutional and indirect pressures, rather than on direct and coordinated policies. The way international factors interacted with domestic developments during the Spanish transition was very different to the way this interaction shaped the transitions of post-communist countries. Whilst the EU actively and explicitly encouraged the democratisation of post-communist Europe before considering accession -established in the Copenhagen Criteria -the EC's role during the Spanish transition was far less structured, uniform and explicit. The model (if we can call it that) of 'democratisation through integration' that has characterised the EU's approach to enlargement since the 1990s (Dimitrova and Pridham 2004 ) cannot be adequately used to explain the interaction between the EC (or its members) and Spain during the democratisation of the latter. Although the EU's positive reinforcement of domestic changes towards good governance in Central and Eastern Europe (Börzel and Van Hüllen 2011) was similar to the way in which the EC influenced positive changes in Spain (i.e. through the use of conditionality), the way conditionality was used as well as the objective of the policies implemented was rather different. The use of conditionality was different in the Spanish case mainly for two reasons. (1) Although it was 'positive' in the sense that the prospect of integration (i.e. 'the golden carrot') was probably a credible optionwithout which European democracy promotion has been considerably less effective (Börzel and Risse 2012, p.203 ) -conditionality was primarily 'negative' since rejecting approaches by Franco's Spain to open accession negotiations with the EC was used as a punitive measure. The EC never openly offered accession conditioned on democratisation, but rather punished the Franco regime with ostracism because of its lack of democracy. In some ways, then, we could also compare the use of conditionality in the Spanish case with the way the EU uses 'negative conditionality' when dealing with its periphery -an approach that seems to have been far less successful (Brummer 2009; Smith 2005, p. 75) . What is more (2), the EU's current approach to conditionality -particularly when dealing with its periphery -is geared towards reinforcing positive developments in the consolidation of 'good governance' by supporting 'desirable features' such as 'participation, accountability, inclusion and transparency' (Carothers and de Gramont 2013, pp. 90-91) . In the Spanish case there was no coordinated attempt to develop this sort of 'desirable features' from below but rather a general commitment to see a democrati Spain and an implicit conditionality that was often used as negative rather than positive reinforcement.
At the same time, although claims that European integration was the 'principal catalyst' for the Spanish transition do seem to overstate its importance, it is rather clear that at the very least the EC shaped, if not 'made', the Spanish transition (Fishman 2003) . In the Spanish case, a specific project of internationalisation (regional integration) exponentially raised its linkage to European democracies -as well as invariably raising its sensitivity to leverage from these democracies (Levitsky and Way 2005; 2010) -as well as contributing towards the development of a democratic 'consciousness' at a social level. What is peculiar about the way in which Europe 'shaped' the Spanish transition is that it was initially non-institutional and not solely related to socioeconomic development (i.e. modernisation theory). The efforts made by the EC and its member states to support democracy in Spain were different in terms of the objective as well as the execution. As such, there are still relevant lessons to be learned from the way Europe shaped the Spanish democratisation process. Particularly considering the current situation in the EU and in its periphery.
Leverage, conditionality and the elites
There is no doubt that 'while the salience of the international context of democratic transitions may […] be easily recognised, analysing its real impact or influence on this process is no easy task either theoretically or empirically' (Pridham 1991 p. 2) . In fact, a thorough analysis of the international aspects of democratisation -especially if we are dealing with what has been referred to as its 'consolidation' stage -requires the analysis of multiple variables and actors.
Such an analysis goes beyond a broad consideration of the international dimension of democratisation as 'contagion' -i.e. democracy seen as a 'virus' and proximity as the main explanatory variable -or as 'control' dynamics -i.e. the role that the 'strategies of regulation and control adopted by the dominant states in the system' play in imposing, promoting or encouraging democracy (Whitehead 1996 pp. 5-8) . A more comprehensive account should recognise that it is 'necessary to work with intricate and elusive patterns of strategic interactions which differ subtly from one case to the next' (ibid, p. 32). The analysis of the way and the extent to which the international context shapes elites behaviour during transitions to democracy is a key part of any such interpretation.
Although the democratisation literature addresses the issue more broadly now, the difficulties of analysing the international context in transitions to democracy remain the same. Way's (2005 and 2010) approach to linkage and leverage in transitions to democracy has presented a novel way of dealing with the international aspect of democratisation at elite level. Although in their model linkage is more important than leverage -leverage may help end authoritarianism but its rarely enough to encourage full democratisation (Levitsky and Way 2005 p. 22 ) -I argue that in the Spanish case the EC's leverage potential was just as important for the democratisation process. In the Spanish case, its transition unfolded in an international context in which leverage was consistently applied; accession into the Common Market was an incentive to democratise and a source of resources for the democratic forces in Spain to utilise.
Or to paraphrase Dimitrova and Pridham (2004 p. 99) , the EC was not afraid of using strong conditionality as the stick and the prospect of membership (and the due access to assistance this entails) as the carrot.
This carrot and stick dynamic often permeates and shapes public opinion, but it is certainly more visible at elite level. Having said this though, it is worth noting that elites are not easy to recognise and identify at the best of times, let alone when dealing with regimes in transition, a period characterised by high levels of uncertainty. The issue of definition and identification certainly adds to the challenge of establishing what part elites play in transitions to democracy.
Nevertheless, elite theorists and supporters of 'pacted transitions' have long claimed that democratisation is a process that is invariably initiated and conducted by the elite(s). After all, if 'a regime change is precisely a change of the rules of the game' then, logically, 'the game for changing the rules cannot entirely be shaped by the incentives structured by the rules being changed' (Colomer 1995, p. 6) . In other words, if all actors were entirely constrained by structural restrains change would simply not occur.
The Spanish transition is certainly one that has been explained repeatedly through this prism of elitism. Josep Colomer (1991 and has -borrowing elements from Przeworski's (1986: 50-56) theoretical framework and using O'Donnell's distinction between 'hard-liners' and 'soft liners' (O'Donnell and Schmitter 1986, pp. 15-16 ) -analysed the outcome of this transition using exclusively game-theory models and rationale. His main argument, i.e. that the elites shaped the democratisation process not by reaching a consensus but by achieving their basic goals, may not be entirely beyond criticism but it certainly cannot be ignored either. Similarly, Nicos Poulantzas (1976) and Otto Holman (1995) offer explanations for the Spanish transition based on elite conflicts rather than a change in societal preferences or pressures from abroad. In this view, different preferences for different sources of capital (European or American) led to a division or conflict between the elites, which the authoritarian regime was unable to resolve (Poulantzas 1976, pp. 29-30) .
There is, however, an argument to be made regarding the futility of focusing on elite behaviour.
Despite most democratisation scholars acknowledging that agency plays an important role in transitions to democracy, there are views that see elite behaviour as nothing more than the result of structural or social constraints. Even the Spanish case, so often used to describe the paradigmatic nature of 'pacted' transitions, has been analysed from perspectives that question the common assumption that 'pacted/negotiated transitions' are more successful than revolutionary transitions. Edles, for instance, claims that it is not enough to say that 'elites reach agreements but we have to explain why they reach these agreements' (1995, pp. 355-7 356). Elite-theory scholars (or 'pactmen' as Edles rather mischievously refers to them) may be right in their attempts to 'correct "deterministic" structural paradigms by highlighting individual agency' (ibid) but fail to put forward a non-deterministic explanation for transitions to democracy. If elites decide to negotiate based on their rational inclination towards utility maximisation, and not because structure limits their possibilities, then how can we explain failed transitions? Is it that elites in some countries are just not rational (ibid, pp. 359-360)?
Clearly we have to consider subjective explanations that cannot be explained by game models.
As will be analysed in the next section, the case of the PCE (Partido Comunista de España) and its leader Santiago Carrillo, exemplify how elite actors do not always act 'rationally'; either because of an error or a political choice not based on individual gains (i.e. the decision to support democracy implied losing the PCE's core supporters). Carrillo's decision to move the PCE closer to Eurocommunism could not have been predicted exclusively through the use of game models.
It has also been argued that the national elites and their respective societies have to share certain characteristics of political culture and, as such, the behaviour of elites is constrained by mass values and preferences. In essence, the general cognitive, affective and evaluative patterns of predisposition that shape political culture may vary from society to society as well as from social segment to social segment (Eckstein 1998, p. 792) but not to the same extent. Even though elites may be able to act independently (in their capacity as self-conscious and selfserving groups) from the rest of society, they are still conditioned by the same orientations that shape society. Considering that 'actors do not respond directly to "situations" but respond to them through mediating "orientations"' (ibid, p. 790), the supposed 'independence' of the elite has to be seriously questioned. Can elites really take decisions that contradict widespread societal attitudes? The distinction between the two groups is 'inherently blurred' since 'both elites and non-elites are part and parcel of the same historical "reality" or drama' (Edles 1995, p. 370) . Inglehart and Welzel's work suggests that 'within a given country, the rich and the poor strata tend to have values that are more similar to each other than to citizens of other countries ' (2005, p. 70) , and that the values and attitudes of all segments of society tend to move in the same direction, if they move at all (ibid, p. 58). In essence, the core values and attitudes of the elites remain closely linked to those of the wider society.
There are, therefore, good reasons for doubting that elite actions (and the institutional arrangements that result from these actions) are at the fore of a causal correlation with democratisation. At the same time, however, there are similarly good reasons for disagreeing with culturalist, institutionalist or structuralist (modernisation) explanations that seem to completely ignore the role of agency in transitions to democracy. Adept leadership can, at the very least, smooth the transition from authoritarianism to democracy. This is of course not the same as saying that elite pacts can, by virtue of their own importance, sustain democracy.
Colombia and Venezuela's democracies during the second half of the last century, for instance, followed the same 'pacted model' of transition in the 1950s, yet their respective democracies evolved very differently (Bejarano 2011, p. 18) . Thus, the widespread opinion during the 1980s that 'pacts endow democracies with healthy doses of stability' no longer holds the sway it once did (ibid, pp. 84-85). Higley and Burton's (1989) theory that the stability of a regime is a direct consequence of the 'unity' of its elites, for instance, may help explain why some regimes are stable and some are not. It does not explain, however, why some regimes are authoritarian, democratic, or something else. The fact is that whilst the existence of pacts may explain stability, it cannot in its own right explain regime type; during the bargaining stages, it is near impossible to gauge if a pact is democratic or undemocratic since this very much depends on the intentions of the elites involved. In fact, the nature of the pacts -democratic or undemocratic -can only be known for certain after these have taken place, and even then it is it is not clear-cut.
Historical Institutionalism and other similar theories of 'structured contingency' (Bejarano 2011 ) already explain how institutional evolution places certain structural limitations on elite bargaining. Even some of the democratisation scholars that take elites as important units of analysis recognise that although 'leadership obviously affects regime outcomes, particularly in the short run […] leadership is less important than international and domestic structural variables' in shaping regime trajectories (Levitsky and Way 2010, p. 82 ). Unless we choose to believe that successful transitions are down to particularly skilled and ideologically committed individuals -thus accepting that a change of leadership would be enough to secure a democratic transition anywhere -we would have to admit that 'leaders' choices often are heavily structured by the domestic and international context in which they operate' (ibid). This article does not claim that democratisation can solely be understood as a top-down process in which elites act independently of societal pressures, or outside the confines of the orientations that condition the rest of the members of a specific society, or indeed unaffected by international pressures and tendencies. I do recognise, however, that agency plays an important part in democratisation processes, and that irresponsible or inept behaviour by elites can severely damage the prospect of democratisation. Or as Alan Knight put it: 'whether horse or jockey is more important is an old racing conundrum, to which most experts would reply that although jockeys can certainly lose races (i.e. elites can squander post-revolutionary opportunities), it is horses, not jockeys, that win races' (1992, p. 119).
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The role that elites and agency play in democratisation processes can simply not be ignored and, in fact, has to be considered as part of any multi-level model of democratisation (Diamond, Linz and Lipset 1995; Linz and Stepan 1996; Merkel 1998) . It is equally important to acknowledge the role elites play in transitions to democracy as it is to identify the limitations of elite-driven theories. At the same time, by analysing the influence of the international context -intensified under the conditions of regional integration -the key role structural contingencies play in elite-level calculations is already being considered. Although international considerations may not, by themselves, explain all of the elites decisions, the international context plays an important part in shaping the transitions once they are set in motion. In the Spanish case, international leverage impacted, at the very least, the speed with which the transitions unfolded, which in turn helps explain the relative success of its democratisation process.
When linkage follows leverage: the Spanish elites and democratic conditionality
The Spanish period of transition -let us say from the assassination by ETA of Franco's chosen respectively -meant that 'the bilateral dimension of intra-Community relations gained ground' (Story and Pollack 2006, p. 133) . Thus, the 1960s and 1970s move from multilateralism did not stop the increase in linkages between Spain and the rest of Europe. In fact, the move towards intergovernmentalis arguably allowed Spain -and in particular its elites -to bypass the EC (and its insistence on democratisation), and develop bilateral links with a number of European nations that were to have a bearing on its transition to democracy. The regime's ultimate foreign policy objective, i.e. its inclusion into all Western international organisations, was in fact never actually achieved. What is more, had it not been for a timely intervention (from Franco's perspective of course) by Churchill's second government, the regime would have found itself far more isolated than it did. Churchill was quick to develop a new policy that backtracked on Atlee's ideologically grounded approach towards the Spanish regime, i.e. that Franco had to be punished for supporting the Axis -a view that was widely supported in France and the United States, and that was to define the stance of the exiled opposition to the regime. Churchill's assessment that Franco's regime was not necessarily 'crueller' than Stalin's or more 'arbitrary' that Salazar's led to a more lenient stance towards his regime. Franco also seemed to be well aware of British fears that an unstable Spain would only benefit the Soviet Union. Thus, although still opposing Franco, strong economic sanctions were avoided and the regime was able to ride the (rather tame) storm that was caused by diplomatic sanctions (Portero 1999, pp. 210-215) . The combination of a pragmatic approach by Great Britain and the eventual acceptance in the United States that Spain had too much strategic value to be ignored or, even worse, alienated (Liedtke 1999, p. 233) , led to the slow rehabilitation of the regime.
Despite the regime's increasingly comfortable position in the international arena during the 1960s, Western Europe (France and Germany in particular) remained a safe haven for the main opposition forces. The unilateral decision by the post-war French provisional government to close its border with Spain for two years, suggests that it was indeed the French who, influenced by their own struggles to re-establish their democracy during the war, took the commitment of seeing a transformation in Spain more seriously than any of the other Western allies (Whitehead 1986, p. 13) . Although this initial commitment may have been overwhelmed by Cold War mentality, France remained the most important centre from where the opposition 11 in exile worked. Although very much irrelevant as an opposition force from the 1950s onwards, the Republican Government in exile settled in Paris in 1945 and continued with its operations there until its dissolution in 1977. Santiago Carrillo, the leader of the PCE, was also exiled in Paris from the end of the Civil War until his arrest in Spain in 1976; and it was primarily from France (and Portugal) that the PCE decided to coordinate its internal opposition to Francoism, which was very much characterised, in the earlier stages, by a guerrilla approach that looked to destabilise the regime (Tusell 2005, p. 79) . France was also the base from where the exiled Socialist Party (PSOE), under the leadership of Rodolfo Llopis and the key assistance of former leader Indalecio Prieto -himself exiled in Mexico -started to develop its opposition strategies.
It was at these early stages of the struggle that the Socialists chose an opposition strategy based almost entirely on external pressure to achieve the eventual transition to democracy (ibid, p. The Franco regime, thus, faced an even more challenging version of the dilemma so often faced by authoritarian regimes elsewhere: how to limit political liberalisation and the influence of opposition forces abroad, without necessarily limiting economic liberalisation or jeopardising the access to international markets and/or investment. After all, the regime's main goal was survival. Thus, as has often been the case in third wave transitions, the regime's change of policy direction towards economic liberalisation was 'invariably made under some form of compulsion' and was also a 'defensive' strategy that looked to maintain '(vulnerable) regime legitimacy' (Pridham 1991, p. 14) . The regime, therefore, needed liberalisation to boost its legitimacy as a modernising force in Spain, but it also desperately wanted to limit the influence international actors (foreign governments, opposition forces abroad or international organisations) could have in domestic affairs. Indeed, these attempts to promote yet also limit international linkages makes it very hard, if not impossible, to establish any sort of causality between the actions of international actors and domestic developments in Spain and elsewhere.
If on top of this common attempt by authoritarian regimes to limit the effects of liberalisation and internationalisation on the domestic political system, we consider that more often than not 'official declarations in favour of democracy in the abstract' by democratic countries correlate 'poorly with observable behaviour affecting specific interests and international relationships' (Whitehead 1986 , p. 7), then it is hardly surprising that democratic leverage is seen as a inefficient instrument of democratisation. Indeed, The EU has been criticised for its inconsistency in applying negative conditionality (sanctions) when promoting democracy and human rights (Brummer, 2009) The case of Spain, however, was different. At elite level, at least, it is easier to identify the influence of the international context by looking at how the actions of domestic actors were constrained by international influences and conditions. At this point it should be noted that I am consciously referring to influence rather than power simply because, as Pridham reminds us (1991: 9) , domestic actors during the earlier stages of liberalisation -more so than during the transition stage itself -'possess a substantial degree of autonomy'. When the balance of power between domestic actors is finely poised -as it was in Spain during the very early stages of the transition (Colomer 1995, p. 9) -influence rather than power is all it takes; in times of high uncertainty such as transitions to democracy (O'Donell and Schmitter 1986, pp. 3-5), secondary considerations such as the international context can lead to significant differences in the outcome of the process. In the case of Spain, the early liberalisation stage not only helped develop international linkages, but it was also a learning curve for Spanish elites. After this initial period it was clear that, although more often than not declarations in favour of democracy do not correlate to the actions taken by foreign democratic governments, the EC's assertion that Spain had to democratise in order to be considered for membership, was one of those rare occasions when official statements actually had 'considerable practical force' (Whitehead 1986, p. 7) . The Francoist elites had to learn the hard way -by having the regime's attempts to open negotiations with the Community dismissed outright -that Europe's support for democracy was, unlike NATO or the UN, more than mere rhetoric. When the letter sent in February 1962 by the Spanish Foreign Minister, Fernando María Castiella, to Walter Hallstein, the President of the Commission, asking for the opening of accession negotiations was merely acknowledged rather than properly replied to (Royo and Manuel 2003, pp. 6-7) , the regime's elites got the clearest indication possible that the EC would not accept a non-democratic country in its ranks.
Although some hope remained that Franco's Spain would eventually reach some sort of association status, occurrences such as the one just described must have helped transform some 'hard liners' into 'soft liners'. Certainly Europe's rejection did not change the views of the 'bunker'. But the strong rejection of the EC must have convinced some of the more pragmatist supporters of Francoism that the very 'regime they helped to implant' would 'have to make use, in the foreseeable future, of some degree or some form of electoral legitimation' (O'Donnell and Schmitter 1986, p. 16), thus becoming 'soft liner' reformers rather than staunch Franquistas. Similarly, although the regime's attempts to get involved in the process of European integration never gained traction, the mere fact that the regime showed an interest in accessing the Community meant a change in policy. From then on the regime's elites and its ministers started to publicly recognise the key role Europe would play in Spain's development and were increasingly positive about Spain's role in the new Europe (Crespo MacLennan 2004: 47) . This change in policy helped moderate, at least in public, some of the more radical views of some sectors of the regime's elites. Those who remained suspicious of the process of European integration were either removed or were not allowed to express their views openly.
What is more, there is no doubt that the regime's change in stance towards the EC provided the exiled opposition with a much-needed common discourse. The opposition based outside Spain had long been suffering from a lack of resources, a lack of support caused by Cold War calculations, and an increasingly divisive rift between different opposition groups and between the domestic and the international oppositions (Aguilar 2000, p. 303) . The process of increasing approximation to Europe (i.e. the furthering of linkages) offered the opposition and the regime a common political objective, albeit for completely different reasons. Whilst the regime pretended to gain legitimacy by benefiting from Europe's economic boom, the opposition saw increasing cooperation with Europe as an opportunity to highlight the incompatibility between the regime and the Community, and also as an opportunity to strengthen its voice inside Spain. Santiago Carrillo's very public acceptance of Eurocommunism, for instance, signified the definitive end to the PCE's relationship with Moscow, and made the PCE's pro-European stance 'official'.
Although, there is a debate surrounding the reasons Carrillo had for embracing Eurocommunism, there is no doubt that this change in policy was a key factor in the transition.
This shift in stance -according to Carrillo himself the communists were the first ones to 'bury the axe of war' -paved the way for the spirit of national reconciliation that was to characterise the transition (Edles 1998, p. 44) . The Suárez government desperately needed to limit the social mobilisations that could threaten the reforms by giving the 'bunker' an excuse to use repression, and thus needed the PCE, with its historical ties with the trade unions (in particular the Comisiones Obreras), to 'induce moderation' amongst the ranks (Encarnación 2001, pp. 76-77) . On the other hand, Carrillo needed the PCE to be legalised in order to participate in any future electoral process. Thus Carrillo and the Communists had no choice but to moderate their stance as part of a bargaining process with Adolfo Suárez's government, i.e. abandoning ruptura was the only way to gain legal status (Colomer 1995, pp. 68-77) . The PCE's electoral failure in the 1977 elections -receiving less than 10 per cent of the votes -would imply that, if 14 it was merely an electoral and self-serving strategy, Carillo made a big mistake when reading the public sentiment; the embracement of Eurocommunism pushed many of the PCE's core supporters to abandon the party, whilst the abandonment of ruptura did little to convince the majority of voters that the PCE's new-found moderation was genuine. An alternative interpretation, however, is that Carrillo's views had been actually moderated after spending forty years exiled in Paris, and that he decided to move his party towards that line rather than the other way around (Edles 1995, pp. 370-372) . Carrillo knew he would lose electoral support but was personally committed to the democratisation of the country and Spain's eventual integration into Europe. More than the obviously important logistic support given by the different European nations (e.g. facilitating travel to the Congress) or the fierce criticism that was aimed at the regime afterwards, the role the 'idea of Europe' played as a unifying force during, before and after the Congress may have been just as important. In essence, it could be said that the process of Spanish integration with Western Europe (in the first instance with the development of informal linkages and then by the process of institutionalising these linkages) 'shaped' rather than 'made' the democratisation process. It would be a great leap to say that there is a direct causal link from integration to democratisation -at least at elite level -but we could say that Europe was a platform, a reinforcing example and an important source of consensus. After all, regardless of how we choose to explain the transition to democracy in Spain, there is no doubt that consensus took precedence over confrontation. I am not denying of course that 'the process of European integration interacted with a wide variety of domestic political and economic factors' (Fishman 2003, p. 32) , but, at least at elite level, the process of European integration considerably increased the prospect of pro-democracy pacts being reached, as well as providing a clear incentive for these pacts to be reached quickly. The importance of the speed with which these agreements were reached and institutionalised (through the 1978 Constitution) should not Not everyone agrees with this interpretation. The view that other than providing moral support to the democratic opposition 'there was very little Europe could do' (Carr and Fusi 1981, p. 214) is also common. Yet there is enough evidence to suggest that Western European countries and the EC, at the very least, played an active part in supporting democratic actors and, thus, influencing the elites' calculations. Even if we were to accept, however, that Europe could only provide moral support, we need to acknowledge that even this minimal influence may have had a significant impact on the calculations of key individuals. Carr and Fusi acknowledge that, if nothing else for instance, King Juan Carlos, being chosen as the successor to Franco after the assassination of Carrero Blanco, needed the legitimacy that could only be provided by the backing of other European nations. Western Europe, unlike the United States, was certainly not going to provide its full backing to Juan Carlos until he proved his democratic credentials.
After all, the reformist agenda eventually pursued by the King was more or less a surprise; we must not forget that Franco himself handpicked the King as his successor (Gilmour 1985) .
Indeed, Juan Carlos' first speech as King could hardly be described as an endorsement of political reform (Aguilar 2000, pp. 306-307) , and his first attempt at forming a government, under the leadership of Carlos Arias Navarro, the last Prime Minister of the Franco era, did little to convince the domestic opposition or the international community that the King was a true democrat. The 'comedy of errors' that was Arias Navarro's government seemed like a half-hearted attempt to 'enact a few reforms, call the result a democracy, and hope for the best' (Gilmour 1985, p. 141) . It was also during these early stages of the transition that European pressure reached its highest level. Before then, there had always been disagreements around Europe over how to react to the imminent transformations in Spain; whilst the conservative forces advocated for moderation, the socialist left considered that ending the Franco regime was a 'European mission' that was long overdue. Ultimately, the disappointing reforms of Arias Navarro, the King's apparent ambivalence towards reform, and the worrying situation in Portugal tilted the balance in favour of those who advocated a stronger stance against continuismo (Crespo MacLennan 2008, pp. 148-149) .
How much of an influence did the barrage of European condemnation have on the King's 'sudden' decision to replace Arias Navarro with Adolfo Suárez, and embark on a far more comprehensive process of political reform, is impossible to know. Spain's romanticised version of its transition has long promoted the idea that Juan Carlos was never anything else than a staunch democrat. However, Juan Carlos had been directly appointed by Franco 'as the best guarantee for the continuation of the institutions and spirit of Francoism' (Carr and Fusi 1981, p. 207) . Franco believed that with the King on the throne the future of the regime was bien atado (tied down) (Bermeo and Gracía-Durán 1994, p. 91) , and Juan Carlos did not make his stance clear until his state visit to the United States in February 1976 when he described the Arias Navarro Government as an 'unmitigated disaster' (Aguilar 2000, p. 308) . If this was his strategy all along or a reaction to changing circumstances, we will probably never know for sure. We should assume, however, that the King must have been influenced by pragmatism as much as by conviction. Juan Carlos was certainly aware of what was happening to his brother in law in Greece -where Constantine's failure to offer his unconditional support to Greece's attempts to establish a republican democracy at least partly led to the defeat of the monarchical alternative in the referendum of 1974 -and of the increasingly antagonistic stance of individual members of Europe towards authoritarian regimes in its periphery. The more or less generalised outrage in Europe that followed the execution of three communist and two ETA members in September 1975 was a clear indication that Europe was ready to take the gloves off. Although the executions went ahead, the regime was seriously damaged by the episode, and was even forced to defend itself after reports by the BBC suggested there was widespread rebellion in the Francoist ranks (Informaciones, 27/09/1975) .
By this stage it was not only painstakingly clear that the EC would not allow non-democratic countries to join its ranks, but also that the Community was going to be 'stricter' with Spanish democracy than with that of Greece or Portugal. Concerns from several member states -France in particular -regarding the very real challenges Spanish accession would bring to the newly established CAP were partly behind this intensified scrutiny, and it was a sobering fact already recognised by some at the time of the transition (Poulantzas 1976, p. 29) . But it is also true that Spanish isolation from Europe had been longer and deeper than that of Greece or Portugal. The This complete isolation was not only an embarrassment for the regime but also provided a strong symbolic statement for elites across the political spectrum. Once there was a consensus amongst the different elites that a transition to democracy was desirable, it became clear that only the explicit recognition of the EC -inherent in accepting Spain's participation in Europewould be enough to legitimise the new Spanish democracy. By refusing to baulk on its democratic conditionality, the different European organisations (the Community and the Council of Europe) became the only judges with enough legitimacy to sanction the emerging democracy (Powell 2007, pp. 52-54) . On the other hand, the eventual integration into Europe's main political and economic organisations -and the inherent process of Europeanisation this meant for Spain -was, particularly from the 1970s onwards, regarded as synonymous of modernisation (ibid: 53). In the mid 1970s the influential magazine Cambio 16 summarised this widespread view; the magazine believed that accession into Europe was more than a short-term solution for orange farmers and bicycle cranks producers, and called it an alternative way of modernisation (Díaz Dorronsoro 2012, p. 64) . Since modernisation was the ultimate goal and accession into Europe was regarded as synonymous with modernisation, there was not a single elite group that could afford to be seen as an obstacle to integration. Thus explaining why all political leaders and other elites supported accession into Europe.
The influence of this strong consensus and the impact it had on the democratisation of the country should not be underestimated. The fact is that Brussels had made it very clear that political reform was the very first step towards integration; the elites knew it and so did the electorate. The fact that Spanish elites believed that democracy was a condition for European integration and that without it there would be no 'modernisation' of Spain helped move the transition forward. The elites similarly acknowledged that only the Community could give the emerging democratic regime the legitimacy it so badly needed. Given that the Spanish economy risked being left behind if Spain did not join the Common Market, and that the vast majority of the population saw integration with Europe in a positive light, elites from all sides of the political spectrum saw integration into Europe as essential. Europe's insistence on democracy, coupled with the elites' calculations of the costs of not joining, meant that the Spanish elites' sensitivity towards European opinion increased exponentially, thus the costs of repression or democratic regressions became higher. In other cases where political considerations have been completely ignored, regional integration does not necessarily improve democracy. The case of North American integration is often used to prove this point. The
United States' silence on political conditionality and reluctance to pressure the Mexican elites (Calderón Martínez, 2014) for example, meant that the political elites in Mexico were able to deal with democratic opposition -for a good while anyways -with a combination of violence, intimidation and coercion, as the elites did not see the economic agreement linked to their attitudes towards democracy (Gentleman and Zubek 1992) .
Conclusion
This analysis of how internationalisation influenced the Spanish transition helps illustrate how sensitive elites are to international pressure when transitions to democracy overlap with projects of internationalisation, or when access to perceived economic benefits is condition on democratic reforms. In the case of Spain, 'Europe as a political example was probably far more important for Spain […] than the European Union as a set of material incentives' (Fishman 2003, p. 40) . There is little doubt that gaining access to the Common Market was an incentive for all the Spanish elites. The key issue here, however, is that Europe decided to actively engage in Spanish democratisation; by conditioning accession into European institutions to democratic reforms, the EC was effectively using its leverage potential. This conditionality in itself was certainly not enough to cause the democratisation of Spain but it certainly played a part in shaping the process. European integration was probably the only thing every single sector of society, political party or key actor could agree on. The widespread belief that EC membership was key to the development of Spain injected the process of democratisation with a certain degree of urgency; without democracy there would be no entry into the Common Market, and without the Common Market there would be no modernisation of Spain.
This sort of consensus at elite level, even if on a single issue, can make all the difference during democratic transitions. This is particularly relevant in cases where the democratic opposition is simply not strong enough to force a complete break with the previous regime. Consensus on a single overarching issue can considerably increase the speed with which elite pacts are reached.
It is widely accepted that 'long transitions', which usually start at the subnational level, and that not achieve a quick institutionalisation of democracy (invariably reached by either pacts or imposition) are less successful in consolidating multi-level democracies than those that do (Hiskey and Bowler 2005) . At the same time, elites are far more susceptible to international leverage when, as the Spanish case elucidates, transitions to democracy take place simultaneously to internationalisation projects. Elites are considerably more susceptible to leverage during the earlier stages of the transition and when access to international markets or international organisation can be conditioned. Once treaties have been signed or access has been granted, however, the leverage potential decreased greatly. In other words, the 'carrot' of allowing access is far more effective than the 'stick' of withdrawing access (or threatening to do so) once this has already been granted; 'the temptation of the carrot is strong [only] as long as the offer of membership has not yet been made, since then the stick of conditionality could become an empty threat' (Dimitrova and Pridham 2004, p.109) . Positive conditionality seems to have been particularly effective in the Spanish case. The EU and other international actors could thus still learn a lesson from the Spanish transition to democracy.
